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North Carolina Bids Goodbye (Again)
to the Rule in Dumpor's Case
JOHN V. ORTH*
On July 12, 2012, Senate Bill 521 became law in North Carolina.' It
amended Chapter 41 of the General Statutes by adding a new section:
§ 41-6.4. Rule in Dumpor's Case abolished.
(a) The rule of property known as the Rule in Dumpor's Case is
abolished.
(b) This section shall become effective October 1, 2012, and applies to
transfers of property that take effect on or after that date.2
The latest in a slow succession of statutes intended to eliminate
ancient rules of property, the statute adds the Rule in Dumpor's Case to the
pile of discarded doctrines that includes the Doctrine of Worthier Title, the
Rule in Shelley's Case,4 and, in significant aspects, the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
By not defining the rule it abolishes, the new statute makes continued
recourse to the common law necessary. The fons et origo of the Rule in
Dumpor's Case is the 1603 English case that gave it its name.6 Although
some of the details are quaint, the four-hundred-year-old case can easily be
restated in modem terms. A long-term lease executed during the reign of
the first Queen Elizabeth included a "proviso that the lessee or his assigns
* William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University.
1. An Act Abolishing the Rule in Dumpor's Case and Concerning Broker Price
Opinions, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 163 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-6.4, 93A-82 to -83,
93E-1-3 to -4, -12 (Supp. 2012)).
2. Id. (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6.4 (Supp. 2012)).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6.2; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-1-2 (1974) (repealed and
replaced in 1979).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6.3; see John V. Orth, Requiem for the Rule in Shelley's
Case, 67 N.C. L. REv. 681 (1989) (discussing the abolition of the Rule in Shelley's Case in
North Carolina); see also John V. Orth, The Mystery of the Rule in Shelley's Case, 7 GREEN
BAG 2D 45 (2003), reprinted in JoHN V. ORTH, REAPPRAISALS IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY 15
(2010) (hereinafter "REAPPRAIsALs").
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15, -23; see John V. Orth, Allowing Perpetuities in North
Carolina, 31 CAMPBELL L. REv. 399 (2009) (discussing North Carolina's abolition of the
Rule Against Perpetuities as applied to trusts if the trustee has power of sale).
6. Dumpor's Case, (1603) 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (KB.); 4 Co. Rep. 119 b.
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should not alien the premises to any person or persons, without the special
licence [sic] of the lessors."7 In other words, the lease included a covenant
against transfer without permission. After a few years, the lessors granted
the lessee permission "to alien or demise [i.e., lease] the land,"'8 and the
lessee then "assigned the term" to a person who devised it to his son.' The
son subsequently died intestate,o and the administrator of the son's estate
assigned the lease to Symms." The lessors, claiming that the reassignment
without permission gave them a right to re-enter,12 then executed a new
lease to Dumpor.'3  Symms maintained his right to possession, and
Dumpor's Case is Dumpor's suit against Symms for trespass.14 On these
facts, "judgment was given against the plaintiff"; that is, Dumpor lost.15
The reassignment to Symms did not require permission, so it was valid. 16
Dumpor's Case was assured its enduring place in property law by its
inclusion in the influential law reports prepared by Sir Edward Coke, the
7. Id. at l11l,4Co.Rep.at 119b.
8. Id. at 1112, 4 Co. Rep. at I19 b. Leaseholds may be transferred by assignment
(transfer of all the remaining term), or by sublease (transfer of less than all the remaining
term). ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 8:10 (1980).
According to another report of Dumpor's Case, the permission was "to alien the premises,
or any part, for the entire term, or for part thereof . . . ." Dumper v. Syms, (1603) 78 Eng.
Rep. 1042 (K.B.) 1042; Cro. Eliz. 815, 815.
9. Dumpor's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 1112, 4 Co. Rep. at 119 b. According to Dumper
v. Syms, counsel argued that if the covenant not to transfer without permission continued to
bind the assignee, then it was breached by the devise, but the court did not find it necessary
to decide this point since it held that the covenant did not continue. Dumpor, 78 Eng. Rep.
at 1043, Cro. Eliz. at 816.
10. Property passing by intestate succession passes by operation of law, and such
involuntary assignments do not violate a covenant against transfer. See 7 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 282 & n.4 (2d ed. 1937) (noting that covenants
against transfer "do[] not apply when the property passes by operation of law," such as in
cases of death).
11. Dumpor's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 1112, 4 Co. Rep. at 119 b.
12. Coke's report does not indicate whether the lessors claimed their right to re-enter
pursuant to a power reserved in the lease or whether they claimed that the breach of a
condition caused a forfeiture.
13. Id. The yearly rent reserved in the lease to Dumpor was 22 shillings, compared
with 33 shillings and 4 pence reserved in the original lease, which Symms was eager to
preserve. Id. It is tempting to think that Dumpor got the lease at a discount because of the
legal uncertainty.
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greatest authority on the common law of property." Unlike modem law
reports-factual statements of cases and their results-Coke's reports
include extended discussions of legal issues, whether actually decided by
the court or not.' 8 Like a case annotated in American Law Reports today, a
case in Coke's reports may be no more than "a peg on which to hang his
disquisition," although Coke's editorial additions are not clearly labeled.19
In his report of Dumpor's Case, Coke noted that "divers points were
debated and resolved," 2 0 although for purposes of the eponymous Rule, the
resolution that mattered-the actual holding in the case-was that "if the
lessors dispense with one alienation, they thereby dispense with all
alienations.. .. In other words, a covenant against transfer without
permission is terminated by permission to make the first transfer, and the
leasehold is thereafter transferable without further permission.
Perhaps the most difficult point that was debated and resolved in
Dumpor's Case concerned the fact that the covenant against transfer in that
case applied by its terms not just to the lessee but also to the lessee's
assigns. The court's resolution of this point was that
although the proviso be, that the lessee or his assigns shall not alien, yet
when the lessors license the lessee to alien, they shall never defeat, by force
of the said proviso, the term which is absolutely aliened by their licence
[sic], inasmuch as the assignee has the same term which was assigned by
their assent.22
17. The eleven volumes of Coke's Reports published during his lifetime enjoyed an
enormous prestige. John William Wallace, who reported decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court from 1863 to 1874 (United States Reports, volumes 68 to 79), noted that Coke's
Reports "are cited not in the way in which Reports are commonly cited, that is to say, by the
name of the reporter," but simply as "The Reports." JoHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE
REPORTERS, ARRANGED AND CHARACTERIZED WITH INCIDENTAL REMARKS 166 & n.3, 193
(Phila., Soule and Bugbee 4th ed. 1882).
18. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 10, at 462-65 (3d ed. 1945).
19. Id. at 464.
20. Dumpor's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 1113, 4 Co. Rep. at 119 b. Other resolutions-not
part of the holding but nevertheless considered to be covered by the Rule in Dumpor's
Case-were (1) where there are multiple tenants subject to a covenant against transfer, a
permission given to one tenant to transfer also terminates the covenant as to the other
tenants, and (2) where permission is given to transfer a part of the leasehold, the permission
also terminates the covenant as to the remaining part. Id. The second question may have
been discussed if, as reported in Dumper v. Syms, the permission by the lessors in that case
was "to alien the premises, or any part . . . ." Dumper, 78 Eng. Rep. at 1042, Cro. Eliz. at
815.




Judges and scholars have struggled for centuries to make sense of this
holding. Chief Justice Samuel Nelson of New York's Supreme Court in
1837 explained that "the license gave to the lessee the power to convey an
absolute interest, free from the restraint of the condition," although he
admitted that this is "assuming the point in question."23 Sir William
Holdsworth, in his monumental twentieth century History of English Law,
while also finding it "difficult to understand the principle upon which
Dumpor's Case is based," thought that "[t]he covenant against assignment
was considered to be attached to the lessee's estate in the land" and that
"the assignee, as a result of the licence [sic], got an estate free from the
covenant, which he could therefore assign or not as he pleased .... "2 4
In historical context, the Rule in Dumpor's Case marks a stage in the
common law's struggle to determine the extent to which interests in
property are alienable.25 If a grant in fee simple cannot be subject to a
restraint on alienation, can a lease-also a conveyance of an estate in
land-be subject to a covenant against transfer? To this day, of course,
leases are, in general, freely alienable.26  And even a dozen years after
Dumpor's Case, an English judge could still doubt whether a covenant
against transfer would be repugnant to the grant, and therefore void, in a
lease expressly granted to a lessee "and his assigns." 2 7 Viewed in this light,
the Rule in Dumpor's Case is actually a grudging acceptance of the validity
of restraints on alienation in leases; they are valid, but subject to strict
construction. While the Rule is an extreme example, courts to this day
continue to interpret restrictions in leases against the landlord.28
The force of stare decisis, aided in this case by the immense prestige
of Sir Edward Coke, maintained the Rule for centuries, even as English
judges began to criticize it. Lord Chancellor Eldon in 1807 admitted that
23. Dakin v. Williams, 17 Wend. 447, 457-58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837). Chief Justice
Nelson was subsequently a United States Supreme Court justice. Frank Otto Gatell, Samuel
Nelson, in 2 JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS 407, 407-20 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997).
24. 7 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 10, at 283.
25. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY §§ 101,
278 (Bos., Bos. Book Co. 2d ed. 1895) (analyzing the implications of conditions upon
assignments and how conditions affect the alienability of property).
26. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 8:10 ("In most instances the interest, or any part
thereof, of a tenant for years or a periodic tenant is freely alienable.").
27. Stukeley v. Butler, (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B.) 317; Hob. 168, 170.
28. See Ann Peldo Cargile & Michael B. Noble, Assignments and Subleases: The
Basics, PROBATE & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 40, 42 ("Many courts perceive restrictions
against assignment or sublease as restraints on alienation. As a result, courts often interpret
restrictive language against the landlord.").
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"Dumpor's Case always struck me as extraordinary," but recognized that "it
is the law of the land at this day"-and actually extended its reach.2 9 And
Chief Justice Sir James Mansfield in 1813 observed that "[c]ertainly the
profession have always wondered at Dumpor's case, but it has been law so
many centuries, that we cannot now reverse it," although he was able to
distinguish it.30
In the nineteenth century, English courts increasingly deferred to
Parliament to reform the common law,31 and a century-long series of
statutes remade traditional land law 32-among them, a statute adopted in
1859 during the reign of Queen Victoria that abolished the Rule in
Dumpor's Case:
Where any Licence [sic] to do any Act which without such Licence [sic]
would create a Forfeiture, or give a Right to re-enter, under a Condition or
Power reserved in any Lease heretofor [sic] granted or to be hereafter
granted, shall at any Time after the passing of this Act be given to any
Lessee or his Assigns, every such License shall, unless otherwise
expressed, extend only to the Permission actually given, or to any specific
Breach of any Proviso or Covenant made or to be made, or to the actual
Assignment, Under-lease, or other Matter thereby specifically authorised
29. Brummell v. Macpherson, (1807) 33 Eng. Rep. 487 (Ch.) 488; 14 Ves. Jr. 173, 175-
76 (holding that even permission to assign limited to a particular assignee terminated the
covenant and permitted reassignment without further permission).
30. Doe v. Bliss, (1813) 128 Eng. Rep. 519 (C.P.D.) 520; 4 Taunt. 735, 736 (holding that
a lessor's failure to object to a transfer in violation of a covenant did not have the same effect
as actual permission). The action of ejectment, used to try title to land, involved the allegation
of a fictitious demise or lease to a fictitious plaintiff, Doe. REAPPRAISALS, supra note 4, at 105.
The form continued in use in North Carolina after the Revolution, where the fictitious lessee
was renamed Den. See id. On this and other legal fictions, see id. Sir James Mansfield, Chief
Justice of Common Pleas (1804-1814), is not to be confused with William Murray, Lord
Mansfield, the famous Chief Justice of King's Bench (1756-1788). See generally C.H.S.
FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD (1936).
31. See BRIAN ABEL-SMITH & ROBERT STEvENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS: A
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 46-47 (1967). The authors state:
the Victorian appeal courts were increasingly careful to avoid the impression that
they were making law-an attitude no doubt influenced by the increasingly
democratic composition of Parliament . . . . [T]he main responsibility for
changing the law had now passed to Parliament. Moreover this was true not only
for major changes of direction, but even for relatively minor ones.
Id.




[sic] to be done, but not so as to prevent any Proceeding for an subsequent
Breach (unless otherwise specified in such License [sic]) .... .
Unlike the recent North Carolina statute, the English statute does not
mention the famous case by name, but rather rejects its holding by
providing that permission for one transfer does not "prevent any
Proceeding for any subsequent Breach .. . The statute applies equally
to conditions that would cause a forfeiture and to powers that would give a
35right to re-enter. It applies to all transfers, subleases as well as
36
assignments. It creates a default rule; that is, one that applies "unless
otherwise expressed."37 And it governs the construction of provisions in
existing leases as well as to those in leases executed after adoption of the
act.38
Still part of the common law in 1776, the Rule in Dumpor's Case was
presumptively received as law in American states. In North Carolina, the
1778 reception statute-still in effect today-expressly adopts "[a]ll such
parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use within this
State" unless "abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete,"4 0 and in 1860-
the year after the repeal of the Rule in England-the North Carolina
Supreme Court alluded to Dumpor's Case without questioning its
33. An Act to Further Amend the Law of Property, and to Relieve Trustees, 1859, 22 &
23 Vict., c. 35, § 1 (Eng.); see also An Act to Further Amend the Law of Property, 1860, 23
& 24 Vict., c. 38, § 6 (Eng.) (concerning that aspect of the Rule in Dumpor's Case that
applied to permission implied by failure to object).
34. An Act to Further Amend the Law of Property, and to Relieve Trustees, 1859, 22 &





39. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (2011).
40. Id. A colonial statute of 1711, reenacted in nearly identical language, provided that
"the common Law, is and shall be, in Force in this Government, except such part . . . [as]
cannot be put in Execution." 2 EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1699-1751
39 (John D. Cushing ed., 1977). It is unknown whether a colonial court had occasion to
consider the applicability of the Rule in Dumpor's Case. The most thorough recent review
of law in colonial North Carolina did not include any mention of it. See generally William
E. Nelson, Politicizing the Courts and Undermining the Law: A Legal History of Colonial
North Carolina, 1660-1775, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2133 (2010). But see Steelman v. City of New
Bern, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (N.C. 1971) (holding that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 "adopted the
common law .. . as of the date of the signing of the Declaration of Independence").
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continued validity.41 Chancellor James Kent in his influential
Commentaries on American Law included the Rule in Dumpor's Case, and
Oliver Wendell Holmes, in the definitive edition of Kent's Commentaries
in 1873, noted that in America "[t]his hard rule is considered as unshaken
law, down to this day.A 2 Ten years later John Henry Wallace, an expert on
the early law reports, observed that Coke's Reports enjoyed, if possible, a
higher respect in America than in England: "[T]he single name of Lord
Coke would oftentimes outweigh the whole bench of Judges whom he
reports.,43
In 1931 the North Carolina Supreme Court confronted the Rule in
Dumpor's Case for the first time in Childs v. Warner Bros. Southern
Theatres, Inc.44 In Childs, a lessor leased commercial property to a lessee,
"his executors, administrators and assigns" for a term of five years, subject
to a covenant that the lessee "shall not convey [the] lease or underlet the
premises without the written consent of the lessors."4 5 Thereafter the lessor
transferred the reversion to the plaintiff, who granted the lessee permission
to assign the lease to the defendant.46
When the defendant subsequently reassigned the lease without further
permission, the plaintiff notified the defendant: "I shall continue to
recognize you as the lessee of the property" and demanded rent.47 The
41. Welch v. Trotter, 53 N.C. 197, 203 (1860) ("[T]he authorities . .. show that in
matters of contract executory, in respect to chattels personal, and likewise chattels real [i.e.,
leases], (see notes to Dumpor's case, I Smith's Leading Cases, 15,) a condition that the
contract, or a conveyance of a chattel, or a lease for years, shall be void, has, in law, the
effect of making the contract, conveyance, or lease for years, void ipso facto, on breach of
the condition."). The court's reference is not to the original report of Dumpor's Case, but to
the notes on the case in 1 JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES ON
VARIOus BRANCHES OF THE LAW: WITH NOTES 15 (Phila., John S. Littell 2d ed. 1844).
42. 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 142 n.(d) (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed.,
Bos., Little, Brown, & Co. 12th ed. 1873).
43. WALLACE, supra note 17, at 192.
44. See generally Childs v. Warner Bros. S. Theatres, Inc., 156 S.E. 923 (N.C. 1931).
45. Id. at 923. The lease further provided that:
if the said lessee shall at any time fail or neglect to perform any of the covenants
hereunto contained and on his part to be performed, or shall be adjudged a
bankrupt or insolvent, then and in that event the lessor shall have the right to






defendant refused to pay claiming that the reassignment relieved him of
liability.48
The first sentence of the court's opinion stated the question to be
resolved:
If a lessor executes a lease to a given lessee, and the lease provides that
the lessee shall not convey the lease nor underlet the premises without the
written consent of the lessor, and thereafter the lessor consents to an
assignment of the lease, can such assignee subsequently make a valid
reassignment of the lease without the consent of the lessor? 49
As the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged, the question bears
obvious similarities to the one answered in Dumpor's Case.50  The only
salient difference between the two cases, in fact, is that in Dumpor's Case
the "proviso" concerning alienation applied to the lessee "or his assigns,"
while in Childs the covenant literally applied to the lessee alone.51 As the
court recognized, some American courts, "in order to avoid the application
of the principles in the Dumpor Case," distinguished single from multiple
covenants and held that "if the covenant were single, Dumpor's Case
applied; but, if the covenant were not single, Dumpor's Case did not
apply."5 2  While accurate as a description of the American cases, this
statement has been described as "ironic," since the covenant at issue in
Dumpor's Case was multiple. 3 In any event, at this point in the court's
opinion it appeared that it intended to apply the Rule in Dumpor's Case and
rule in favor of the defendant.
But the court then proceeded to construe the covenant against transfer
in Childs as multiple in fact, although not in form.54 The property was
leased to the lessee, "his executors, administrators and assigns" and the
covenant to pay rent also bound the lessee, "his executors, administrators
48. Id. 923-24.
49. Id. at 923.
50. See id. at 924 (comparing Dumpor's Case to the case at bar).
51. Id. at 923; Dumpor's Case, (1603) 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (K.B.) 1110-11; 4 Co. Rep.
119 b.
52. Childs, 156 S.E. at 924. The Rule in Dumpor's Case actually makes more sense
when applied to "single" covenants. See Investors' Guar. Corp. v. Thompson, 225 P. 590,
594 (Wyo. 1924) (observing that "many conditions are single" and that "the view that a
waiver of the condition-since conditions are construed strictly-necessarily destroys the
whole is probably correct"); see also Lynch v. Joseph, 228 A.D. 367, 370 (N.Y. App. Div.
1930) (holding that a single covenant did not run with the land and bind assigns).
53. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 8:18 n.59.
54. Childs, 156 S.E. at 924.
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and assigns."55 The court concluded that "a reasonable construction of the
lease involved in this case leads to the conclusion that the restriction
against assignment and subletting operated upon the heirs and assigns of
the lessee as well as upon the lessee himself."5 6 At this point in its opinion,
it appeared that the court, relying on precedent from other states limiting
the application of the Rule in Dumpor's Case to single covenants, intended
to rule in favor of the plaintiff.
Abruptly, the court changed the subject. "Without entering into any
discussion of the distinctions which may exist between single and multiple
covenants" against transfer, it suddenly turned to another covenant in the
lease in Childs.57 "The covenant to pay rent is continuous in its nature, and
such covenant is binding by express provision upon the assigns of the
lessee . ... "" Of course, even without this "express provision," a covenant
to pay rent is one that "runs with the land" and binds assignees in
possession who are in privity of estate with the lessor.59 According to the
general rule, a valid reassignment, by ending an assignee's right to
possession, breaks the privity of estate and ends the assignee's liability for
rent.60  But the North Carolina court, by adding the comment that "all
persons occupying the premises under the assignment from the lessee were
charged with notice of the conditions imposed by the writing under which
they held title to the premises," 6' seemed to suggest an alternate holding: in
North Carolina-contrary to the general rule-an assignee would be liable
for rent, at least if the covenant to pay rent bound the lessee "and assigns,"
regardless of whether there was a valid reassignment or not.
Nonetheless, without pause, the court proceeded to announce its
holding, answering the question with which it began: "[W]e hold that, by
consenting to one assignment, the lessor did not waive the conditions of the
lease and did not consent that thereafter any subsequent assignee could turn
his property over to the use and occupancy of any undesirable or
irresponsible person without his approval." 62 Stripped of the aspersion cast
55. Id. at 923-24.
56. Id. at 924.
57. Id.
5 8. Id.
59. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 8:12 ("Upon the lessee's assignment of his leasehold,
the privity of estate between lessor and lessee is destroyed and a new privity of estate is
created between the lessor and the assignee.").
60. Id. ("[T]he assignee's liability ends upon an assignment of his estate.").
61. Childs, 156 S.E. at 924.
62. Id.; see also SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 8:12 ("[T]he assignee, by reassigning,
may escape further liability even though the transfer is made to a financially irresponsible
2012013]
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on the second assignee (for which there is no support in the opinion in
Childs), this appears to be a rejection of the Rule in Dumpor's Case and-
despite the possibility of a dubious alternate holding-was so understood at
the time. 3 In 1952 the authoritative American Law of Property, after
observing that "the majority of cases in this country, while criticizing the
Rule, have purported to follow it," noted Childs as "contra."64
But doubt remained. Without an unequivocal holding in Childs, the
leading North Carolina property treatise cautiously stated that the Rule in
Dumpor's Case "may still be in effect." 65  What made the situation
tolerable was that a well advised lessor could avoid any question of the
vitality of the Rule by conditioning permission to transfer on agreement by
the assignee that reassignment required further permission 66 or, if the lessor
person for the express purpose of escaping liability, notwithstanding that the lease purports
to bind assigns."). This seemingly harsh rule can be justified by recalling that the lessee, on
whose credit-worthiness the lessor originally relied, remains liable on the covenant to pay
rent. Id. ("[The lessee] remains liable upon all the terms of his contract."). The rule does
not apply if the reassignment is merely colorable, that is, if the assign retains the beneficial
use and enjoyment of the premises. Id.
63. See W.T. Covington, Jr., Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Effect of Consent to
One Assignment ofLease on Condition Not to Assign-Dumpor's Case, 9 N.C. L. REV. 455,
458 (1931) ("The judgment for the plaintiff... would entail the existence of the condition
and a repudiation of the rule in Dumpor's Case."); T. C. Kammholz, Comment, Landlord
and Tenant-Liability of an Assignee of a Lease after Reassignment, 7 Wis. L. REV. 51, 51
(1931) ("The court held that the doctrine of Dumpor's Case was repudiated in North
Carolina .... ).
64. 1 THOMAS E. ATKINSON ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES § 3.58, 305 n.34 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
65. Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina states:
The ancient rule, known as the Rule in Dumpor's Case, dating from 1603, may
still be in effect in North Carolina. While a number of states have repudiated this
rule, North Carolina has not expressly repudiated the rule and has one decision
that is susceptible of the interpretation that the rule still exists and will apply under
proper circumstances.
1 JAMEs A. WEBSTER, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 12.30
(Patrick K Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 5th ed. 1999) (footnotes omitted).
66. Id. § 12.30 ("[T]he Rule in Dumpor's Case can easily be circumvented in every case
by the lessor giving only a qualified consent, that is, consent conditioned on there being no
further breach."). The lessor's grant of permission to transfer is the consideration for the
assignee's agreement not to reassign without further permission. See Kammholz, supra note
63, at 52. Furthermore:
[W]here the lessee is required under the lease to obtain the consent of the lessor to
an assignment in order to render such assignment valid, and the lessor, in
consideration of his assenting thereto, obtains from the assignee an agreement to
assume all the covenants of the lease, a privity of contract is created, and the
202
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had sufficient bargaining power, by conditioning permission on agreement
by the assignee to assume all the covenants of the lease.
In 1931, the North Carolina Supreme Court bade an uncertain farewell
to the Rule in Dumpor's Case.68 In 2012, the North Carolina General
Assembly made a second attempt to say goodbye. 69 But a successful send-
off depends on what exactly the new statute means by "[t]he rule of
property known as the Rule in Dumpor's Case." 70  As noted in Childs,
some American courts, "in order to avoid the application of the principles
in the Dumpor Case," had made attempts, some of them disingenuous, to
narrow the scope of the Rule.7  Not only are there cases that confine the
Rule to covenants that are single rather than multiple,72 there are also cases
holding that the Rule does not apply to covenants at all, but only to
conditions. Additionally there are cases that confine the Rule to transfers
assignee remains liable on the covenants of the lease after a re assignment without
the consent of the lessor. This rule does not apply where there is no such consent
required from the lessor, as the assignee's promise is without consideration and
therefore unenforceable.
Id.
67. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 8:12. Schoshinski states, "Where the assignee
agrees to assume the lessee's covenants and obligations, privity of contract arises between
the lessor and the assignee." Id. He further explains, "As the assignee's liability in this
situation is not based on privity of estate, it survives his subsequent assignment of the
lease." Id.
68. See generally Childs v. Warner Bros. S. Theaters, 156 S.E. 923 (N.C. 1931).
69. See generally An Act Abolishing the Rule in Dumpor's Case and Concerning
Broker Price Opinions, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 163 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-6.4,
93A-82 to -83, 93E-1-3 to -4, -12 (Supp. 2012)).
70. Id. (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6.4).
71. Childs, 156 S.E. at 924.
72. E.g., Investors' Guar. Corp. v. Thompson, 225 P. 590, 594 (Wyo. 1924). The court
observed that it is misleading to cite Dumpor's Case where the covenant against transfer is
single:
[T]hat is not the gist of that case. The vital point of that case, the vice of it, is that
it holds that a condition in a lease is single, notwithstanding the fact that it is made
binding not only upon the lessee but also upon his assigns, and that hence one
license destroys the whole condition.
Id.
73. E.g., Williams v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 201, 209 (N.Y. 1839). In New York-until
1846-appeal lay from the state Supreme Court to the Court for the Correction of Errors,
composed of the entire New York Senate, augmented by the state's Chancellor and the justices
of the state Supreme Court. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, § 32; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. V, § 1.
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by assignment and refuse to apply it to subleases, 74 as well as cases that
distinguish a lessor's waiver by failure to object from express permission to
transfer."
North Carolina's experience with the abolition of another venerable
rule of property, the Doctrine of Worthier Title, is instructive in this
regard. 6 In 1974, the General Assembly adopted a statute with the
following seemingly straightforward provision: "The common-law doctrine
of worthier title, both the wills branch and the deeds branch, is hereby
abolished."" The difficulty was that the "common-law doctrine of worthier
title" was a rule of law, while the Doctrine, as applied by the leading
American case, treated it as a rule of construction. Uncertainty about what
exactly the 1974 statute meant led five years later to its repeal and
replacement with the current statute:
The law of this State does not include: (i) the common-law rule of worthier
title that a grantor or testator cannot convey or devise an interest to the
grantor's or testator's own heirs, or (ii) a presumption or rule of
interpretation that a grantor or testator does not intend, by a grant or devise
to the grantor's or testator's own heirs or next of kin, to transfer an interest
to them 80
The difficulty is rooted in the fact that courts in the common law tradition
tend to deal with inconvenient precedents by distinguishing them, rather
than by rejecting them outright.8' Dumpor's Case has suffered this fate for
centuries, making it difficult in many jurisdictions to state exactly what its
notorious Rule is. For the 2012 statute to have the effect of clarifying the
law of North Carolina concerning covenants against transfer, it would be
best to disregard the cases from other jurisdictions that distinguish
74. E.g., Miller v. Newton-Humphreville Co., 116 A. 325, 325 (N.J. Ch. 1920).
75. E.g., Doe v. Bliss, (1813) 128 Eng. Rep. 519 (C.P.D.) 520; 4 Taunt. 735, 736.
76. The Doctrine of Worthier Title, more descriptively labeled "the rule against
remainders to the grantor's heirs" or "the conveyor-heir rule," converted an apparent
contingent remainder in the grantor's heirs into a vested reversion in the grantor.
REAPPRAISALS, supra note 4, at 22-23. The Doctrine applied to devises ("the wills branch")
and to inter vivos grants ("the deeds branch"). Id.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-1-2 (1974) (repealed and replaced in 1979).
78. SIR EDWARD COKE ET AL., A READABLE EDITION OF COKE UPON LITTLETON § 19
(Oxford University, Saunders 1830) ("If a man make a gift in tail, or a lease for life, the
remainder to his own right heirs, this remainder is void, and he has the reversion in
him .... ").
79. Doctor v. Hughes, 122 N.E. 221, 221-22 (N.Y. 1919).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6.2(a) (Supp. 2012).
81. See Childs v. Warner Bros. S. Theaters, 156 S.E. 923, 924 (N.C. 1931) (noting how
courts create mechanisms to work around Dumpor's Case).
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Dumpor's Case and, instead, to accept the maximum extent of the Rule: "If
the lessors dispense with one alienation, they thereby dispense with all
alienations." 82
In its most comprehensive statement, the Rule in Dumpor's Case
applies to: (1) conditions causing forfeiture and powers giving a right of re-
entry; (2) transfers by assignment and transfers by sublease; (3) single
covenants and multiple covenants; and (4) waiver by failure to object and
express permission to transfer. Stated positively, the law in North Carolina
after October 1, 2012 includes a presumption that permission to make one
transfer does not terminate a covenant against transfer; that is, in the words
of the 1859 English statute that abolished the Rule: "any Licence [sic] . . .
shall, unless otherwise expressed, extend only to the Permission actually
given ... but not so as to prevent any Proceeding for any subsequent
Breach." 83 The presumption would apply to covenants in leases executed
prior to October 1, 2012, as well as to those in leases executed thereafter. 84
While the abolition of the Rule in Dumpor's Case represents the
ungrudging acceptance of restraints on alienation in leases, it also represents
a triumph for the lessor's presumed intention over a strict, potentially intent-
defeating rule. Now that covenants against transfer are to be liberally
construed, attention will necessarily turn to whether there are any restraints
on a lessor's right to refuse permission for a transfer. The question is usually
framed as whether a lessor may withhold consent "unreasonably." In
England, the 1927 Landlord and Tenant Act provides that permission to
assign or sublease may not be unreasonably withheld.85 And in America, the
1977 Restatement of the Law of Property adopts the position that "the
landlord's consent to an alienation by the tenant cannot be withheld
unreasonably .... "8  Properly speaking, the issue is not whether the lessor
82. Dumpor's Case, (1603)76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (K.B.) 1113; 4 Co. Rep. 119 b, 120 a.
83. An Act to Further Amend the Law of Property, and to Relieve Trustees, 1859, 22 &
23 Vict., c. 35, § 1 (Eng.).
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6.4(b).
85. Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 19 (Eng.).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. LAND. & TEN. § 15.2(2) (1977). As admitted by the
Reporter at the time, this is a "minority view" among the states. Id. Twenty-five years later,
the situation had not changed. Case law "in a slight minority of jurisdictions implies that the
prime landlord's consent cannot be unreasonably withheld, unless there is express language
setting forth a stronger standard for consent." Brent C. Shaffer, Sublease Due Diligence,
PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 50.
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may behave "unreasonably" but whether the lessor must be prepared to prove
the reasonableness of a refusal in court. In other words, may the lessor "just
say no?"
In 1981, the North Carolina Court of Appeals answered that question in
the affirmative, holding that a covenant against assignment or subletting
"bars the tenant from such a transfer if the lessor reasonably or unreasonably
withholds his consent." 87  Only if the lease itself requires that the lessor
behave reasonably or otherwise provides an objective standard by which to
test the appropriateness of the lessor's refusal is the lessor prohibited from
withholding consent "based on arbitrary considerations of personal taste,
sensibility, or convenience . . "88 This has been criticized as "inconsistent
with the landlord's duty to mitigate damages." 8 9  But in 2006, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that the duty to mitigate may be eliminated
by covenant in a commercial lease.90 The combination of such a covenant
and a covenant against transfer leaves a distressed lessee with few options
other than bankruptcy. 9'
87. Isbey v. Crews, 284 S.E.2d 534, 536 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 536-37.
89. 1 WEBSTER, supra note 65, at § 6.20 n.254. There is no true "duty to mitigate
damages." Instead the party suffering the breach is disabled to recover damages from the
breaching party to the extent that action by the former could have reduced the loss caused by
the latter. Stephanie G. Flynn, Duty to Mitigate Damages Upon a Tenant's Abandonment,
34 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 721, 723 (2000) ("The phrase 'duty to mitigate' gives a false
impression of the landlord's position when the tenant breaches the lease agreement.
Numerous scholars and commentators have questioned the accuracy of the phrase.").
90. Sylva Shops Ltd. P'ship v. Hibbard, 623 S.E.2d 785, 792-93 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
This case was criticized in Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina. 1 WEBSTER, supra
note 65, § 12.28.
91. See Sylva Shops Ltd. P'ship, 623 S.E.2d at 788 n.1. Although this case and Isbey,
284 S.E.2d at 536, are not Supreme Court decisions, they are likely to remain final
statements of North Carolina law because of the interaction of two rules: (1) The decision of
one panel of the Court of Appeals is binding on all other panels, unless overturned by a
higher court, In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of the Sediment
Pollution Control Act, 379 S.E.2d 30, 36-37 (N.C. 1989), and (2) there is an automatic right
of review by the Supreme Court only if the case directly involves a constitutional question,
or if there is a dissent in the Court of Appeals, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (2011). The result
is that any subsequent plaintiff raising the same issue decided in either Sylva Shops or Isbey
should lose in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the decision of the
Court of Appeals should be unanimous, meaning that only if a petition for discretionary
review is granted will the plaintiff have the opportunity to present the issue to the Supreme
Court. Id. § 7A-31 (providing discretionary review by the Supreme Court only if the case is
of "significant public interest," "involves legal principles of major significance," or if "[t]he
decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court"). Few plaintiffs will be likely to bear the costs in time and expense in the
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A lease is a conveyance with promises attached, or putting it the other
way around, "[a] lease is a contract which contains both property rights and
contractual rights." 92  At the time Dumpor's Case was decided, the
property aspect of leases was uppermost, so the rights of the lessee as
owner of an estate in land were emphasized and restraints on the alienation
of that estate discouraged. With the passage of time, the focus of the law
shifted toward contract, with its emphasis on the intention of the parties.
While the abolition of the Rule in Dumpor's Case is a belated application
of contract principles to the construction of covenants against transfer-of
practical significance only to a lessor who neglects to require an express
agreement from the assignee or subtenant-the increasing emphasis on the
contractual aspect of leases inevitably benefits the party with the most
bargaining power, typically the lessor. Unless the covenant against transfer
expressly imposes a requirement of reasonableness, a lessor may refuse
permission to transfer without explanation, and if the lessor's market power
is sufficiently strong, the lessor may even secure an exemption from the
ordinary duty to mitigate damages.
hopes of having that opportunity. For a proposal to provide more effective review of the
decision of a single panel of the Court of Appeals, see John V. Orth, Why the North
Carolina Court of Appeals Should Have a Procedure for Sitting En Banc, 75 N.C. L. REV.
1981 (1997).
92. Strader v. Sunstates Corp., 500 S.E.2d 752, 756 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
93. This shift in the law of leases was only a specific instance of a general
reconceptualization of legal relations in contractual terms. For further examples, see John
V. Orth, Contract and the Common Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 44
(Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998).
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